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This thesis identifies the factors that make the Swedish bank Handelsbanken resilient. Throughout 
the financial crises in recent memory, Handelsbanken has remained strong and managed to avoid 
bailouts from the Swedish government. Since the crisis of 2008, much effort from governments and 
independent committees has been put into strengthening the regulatory frameworks that banks abide 
by. Handelsbanken managed to stay strong despite these regulations proving too weak during the 
crises. Therefore, this thesis focuses on understanding what attributes as an organisation 
Handelsbanken possess to make them resilient to crises.  
Through a series of interviews with branch managers of different branches of Handelsbanken, 
the most important factors that increase the resilience of Handelsbanken are identified. The 
interviews provide a picture of the organisational culture and its strong ties to the company’s credit 
policy, revolving around making decisions locally and always remaining close to the market. A risk 
avert culture and organisational structure was unanimously identified as the most important factor 
by all interviewees. Beside this, the regulation frameworks and increased precision in credit issuing 
that have developed since the crisis of 2008 also increased the resilience of the bank.  
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This chapter introduces the focus of the thesis as well as formulate the problem 
background. Further, chapter 1 contains the aim and research question as well as 
the delimitations of the study.  
1.1 Background 
The Financial crisis of 2008 is fresh in many people's memory and is seen as one 
of the worst financial crises ever. As with any crisis, it did not happen due to one 
singular event. The main causes lie within the mortgage market (Greenglass et.al, 
2014). Subprime mortgages and the subsequent trading with the mortgage securities 
are often pointed out as the factors causing the crisis. In light of this, the straw that 
broke the camel's back was the bursting of the housing bubble in the United States 
(Bergström, 2009). Predatory and irresponsible banking mainly in the United States 
saw banks owning mortgages for houses of which the value had dropped 
dramatically (Niinimäki, 2008). Although this was the trigger, insufficient 
structural capital, and too high levels of leverage was one of the reasons for the 
subsequent snow-ball effect that followed in banking worldwide (Vazquez & 
Federico (2015). All over the world, banks were hit hard by the financial crisis, and 
bailouts happened in more countries than Sweden. The regulations that were in use 
before the crisis, namely, Basel I & II (the latter being implemented just before the 
crisis of 2008 struck) proved to be too weak to withstand a global economic collapse 
(Atkinson & Blundell-Wignall, 2010). Compared on an international level, the 
large Swedish banks came out of the financial crisis relatively unscathed (Esmaili, 
2010). Because the large banks of Sweden did not hold any large exposure in the 
US market the events there did not affect Swedish banks in the same way. 
(Finansdepartementet, 2013) Despite this, many Swedish banks required bailouts 
and some institutions even requiring governmental absorption (Barr & Pierrou, 
2015a). An area of concern was the Baltics, where the markets were hit hard. 
Especially SEB and Swedbank had exposure in this market. Carnegie Investment 
Bank had to apply for a crisis-loan at the Swedish National Bank and was later 
absorbed by Riksgälden, a back then newly formed Swedish bank support authority. 
Nordea had to do a rights issue to secure new capital from investors. The Swedish 
1. Introduction 




government, which was already the owner of 20% of Nordea, decided to partake in 
the rights issue effectively buying new shares for 5.6 billion SEK.  However, certain 
banks managed to handle the financial crisis rather well. Handelsbanken was one 
of the Swedish banks that retained high structural liquidity throughout the crisis and 
the following recession (Esmaili, 2010).  
More than a decade prior to the crisis of 2008, Sweden, Finland and Norway 
were subjects to a more local financial crisis. Because of the nature of this paper, 
the author will only cover the crisis in Sweden. Again, the trigger of this crisis can 
be found within the housing market, although the underlying causation can again 
be credited to multiple factors (Barr & Pierrou, 2015b).  In the 80s, deregulation of 
the Swedish credit market created an economic boom. When the boom ended as a 
result of a tax reform the interest rate on mortgages rapidly increased, leading to a 
lower demand on the housing market. Because of the lower prices on the housing 
market, financial institutions found themselves owning collateral that was worth 
less than the mortgage they secured. The result of the Swedish crisis was 
governmental intervention in the form liability guarantees and ownership takeover 
in some of the large banks in Sweden (Ergungor, 2007). The most severely hit banks 
were Sparbanken Första, Nordbanken and Gota bank. Sparbanken received a loan 
guarantee from the Swedish government, meaning that they would assume all the 
debt of Sparbanken if Sparbanken could not pay them. Sparbanken is known as 
Swedbank today. Gota bank declared bankruptcy and the government assumed 
control of the bank. Gota bank was later absorbed by Nordbanken, which was also 
acquired by the government and after a merger with Merita Bank (Finland), 
Unibank (Denmark) and Kreditkassen (Norway), became Nordea (Nordea, n.d).  
Out of the large banks in Sweden, only Handelsbanken did not enter discussion 
with the government about state intervention (Englund, 2015). In the end, both 
Handelsbanken and SEB managed the crisis without governmental intervention 
(Affärsvärlden, 2009). Both organisations instead issued new shares in the fall of 
1993. SEB emitted new shares at a total value of 5.3 billion SEK, while 
Handelsbanken issued new shares at a total of 2.65 billion SEK. For reference, 
when compared to the total equity at the turn of the year 1992-1993, this represented 
a 31.5% increase of equity for SEB, and a 15.5% increase for Handelsbanken. It is 
hard to compare the performance of each bank to one another based on this alone, 
but it is safe to determine a consistency in the resilience of Handelsbanken when 
viewing their performance in both the crises mentioned in this chapter. Resilience 
in organisations describes the organisation´s ability to resist hardship, in this case 
financial crises and recession, and subsequently recover from aforementioned 
hardships (Duchek, 2019). This study will use the concept of resilience to explain 
what made Handelsbanken cope with the negative situation that is a financial 
crisis.   




1.2 Problem Statement 
For many people, the financial crisis of 2008 was devastating. Because of the strong 
connection between the failure of the US housing market and the crisis, many 
people lost their homes, as well as their jobs. Credit institutions had to declare 
bankruptcy and the flaws of subprime-mortgages and increasingly risky credit debt 
obligations became visible. Swedish institutions too suffered from the crisis, As 
previously mentioned, massive governmental interventions occurred in the Swedish 
banking industry too. Despite the four large banks in Sweden, Swedbank, Nordea, 
SEB and Handelsbanken, requiring governmental subsidies or capital from the 
private sector, they survived the crisis. All of the four large banks needed some sort 
of capital injection, with Handelsbanken securing a loan on tier 1 capital and the 
remaining three securing capital through rights issues (Bergström, 2009). The need 
for capital to sustain themselves during a crisis indicated that regulations were too 
lenient leading up to the crisis. This is supported by the Basel Committee, the 
committee responsible for developing the most commonly used regulation 
framework for banks (BCBS, 2009). The wellbeing of banks is of interest to many 
people, as the private economy of people depend on banks through savings in the 
bank and secured loans, often with a home as collateral. This also applies to 
companies with liabilities in a bank, or even a government that may hold shares in 
a bank or have issued capital loans to a bank. As could be seen in the US following 
the 2008 financial crisis, the government and subsequently the taxpayers, were the 
ones that had to pay the bill when the banks failed. Sweden too saw the government 
bailing out the banks when they could not cover their losses, in the form of 
guaranteed loans and stock acquisitions (Bergström, 2009; Barr & Pierrou, 2015). 
During the financial crisis in the beginning of the 1990s, only two of the large 
banks, Handelsbanken and SEB, survived without governmental support 
(Affärsvärlden, 2009). SEB and Handelsbanken both carried out rights issues after 
the crisis to cover their losses.  
The rules regarding who pays for the bank’s failure has since changed and in 
accordance with the Swedish statutory regulations, lenders and shareholders in the 
bank takes the brunt of the costs. Nonetheless, the failure of a large bank affects 
society negatively. Following the crisis of 2008, much research has been done as to 
why the crisis happened, what the short-and-long term effects were and how 
another crisis can be prevented. Similarly, research on the Swedish financial crisis 
of the early 90s is on a general level. The existing research on both crises mostly 
revolves around how international regulations can be strengthened, or as in the case 
of Bergström (2009) and both articles concerning the crises by Barr & Pierrou 
(2015a; 2015b), aftermath reports. The area where the research seems to be lacking 
is from the more specific perspective on what constitutes resilience in banking. 
While the concept of resilience is explored in a general organisational aspect, it is 
hard to find specific research on how it applies to banks in particular. Regulations 




and programs for managing an ongoing crisis serves to strengthen the resilience of 
a bank but understanding why certain banks are more resilient than others require 
in depth analysis of different aspects of a bank. For example, the statutory 
regulations framework in Sweden applies to all banks registered in the country. 
Despite this, Handelsbanken has managed to deal with both the 2008 crisis and the 
1990s crisis more effectively than the other large banks in Sweden (Englund, 2015), 
(Bergström 2009). In the light of this, the resilience of Handelsbanken will be the 
focus of this study. Previous comparative studies have managed to highlight the 
fact that different banks were affected differently by the crises, but not the 
underlying factors that influenced the difference.  
1.3 Aim 
The aim of this study is to understand how resilient the Swedish bank 
Handelsbanken is. Specifically, this paper aims to understand how the concept of 
resilience can explain why Handelsbanken remain strong during financial crises. 
The study will set to answer the following research question: 
 
- What factors make Handelsbanken resilient to the negative effects of a 
financial crisis? 
1.4 Delimitations 
From a theoretical perspective, this thesis will focus on the financial resilience of 
Handelsbanken from a wide perspective. Crisis management, regulations theory 
and organisational culture will be used to identify what factors make 
Handelsbanken resilient to financial crises. This thesis will not focus on financial 
statements or economic data for the purpose of measuring resilience. Instead, the 
focus of the data collection will be to understand what factors within the culture 
and structure of Handelsbanken makes them resilient, as well as overarching factors 
such as banking regulations. From an empirical perspective, the thesis will not 
include any other banks than Handelsbanken, as the purpose of the study is not to 
compare the resilience of Handelsbanken to their competitors. Further, the study 
will not focus on the perception on resilience of other employees than branch 
managers of Handelsbanken.  




This chapter will consist of the theories and concepts that the study is based on. 
Theories relevant to the concept of resilience as well as concepts that that can be 
used to help explain resilience and financial regression will be included here.  
2.1 Financial Resilience 
The concept of resilience in business is relatively new (Duchek, 2019). A general 
definition of the concept is hard to express as the research of the theory is widely 
diverse as shown by Linnenluecke (2017). Resilience as defined in business terms 
by Cambridge Dictionary (2021) is as follows: “The quality of being able to return 
quickly to a previous good condition after problems.“ (Cambridge Dictionary, 
2021).  Duchek (2019) divides organisational resilience into three separate schools 
of definition. The first of these is similar to the definition by Cambridge Dictionary 
in a sense. The theme of the first school is about resistance and recovery, the ability 
to respond to unexpected negative changes and recover from these unexpected 
changes. The goal is to return to the normal state of things. The second school 
focuses on adaptation instead. From this perspective it is important for an 
organisation to capitalise and use the unexpected negative changes to their benefit. 
Contrary to the first school, the goal of the adaptive definition is to come out 
stronger rather than returning to the normal state. It can be broken down to an 
approach where the organisation learns from their mistakes rather than constantly 
put out fires. The third and final school recognised by Duchek (2019) is about the 
anticipation of unexpected negative changes. Compared to the previously 
mentioned two schools, this one focuses on prevention rather than reaction. Rather 
than recovering or improving from the impact of the negative changes, the third 
school argues for avoiding these changes entirely by properly safeguarding. This 
study will use all three of the concepts to produce results.  
2. Theoretical Framework 




2.2 Regulations in Banking   
The banking industry is the most heavily regulated industry in the world (Eken et.al. 
2013). There are several reasons for banking to be so heavily regulated. Because 
banks are responsible for the personal economy of many consumers, people are 
affected by how well the bank is doing and correspondingly, how bad it is doing. 
Among other reasons, regulations are therefore in place to protect consumers and 
taxpayers in general from banks adding too much risk to the capital that the 
consumers have invested in the banks. Other reasons for regulating the banking 
industry are to safeguard against market failure, keep a competitive market and 
generally keep immoral play away from the market. Eken et.al. (2013) further state 
that new regulatory systems or changes to existing systems often comes after a 
financial crisis. This is supported by the introduction of the Basel III framework by 
the Basel Committee, which was introduced shortly after the 2008-crisis (Bank for 
International Settlements n.d). It is worth noting that the most recent revision of the 
Basel regulations, Basel IV, that is being implemented during 2021, was not the 
result of a financial crisis (Swedish Banker´s Association, 2018).  
2.2.1 The Basel Committee  
One of the most common and widely used regulation framework today is the Basel 
III regulations by the Basel Committee (Bank for International Settlements, n.d). 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), commonly referred to 
simply as The Basel Committee, is an international committee focusing on banking 
regulations and establishing frameworks for such matters (Bank for International 
Settlements, n.d). The Basel Committee is based in Basel, Switzerland at the Bank 
for International Settlements. What is named the Basel III is the latest of the 
regulatory frameworks created by The Basel Committee. Basel III was built upon 
the previous framework, Basel II, which in turn was built upon Basel I. Basel I was 
introduced by the Basel Committee in 1992 with the aim to make banks more 
resilient by raising their minimum capital requirement levels so that they could 
withstand longer periods of losses (Atkinson & Blundell-Wignall, 2010). 
Essentially, capital requirements mean that a bank must hold a certain amount of 
capital in reserves to be able to remain solvent in a crisis (European Council, 2020) 
The regulations are presented in the form of restrictions on the ratio of capital to 
Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA). The risk weight calculation on different loans in the 
Basel regulations is quite complicated, but essentially, different types of loans have 
a different risk weight. The complicated part is how these risk weights are 
calculated, but the calculation of risk weighted assets is simple in comparison. The 
more secure a loan is, the lower the risk weight and vice versa (Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority, 2020). Governmental securities and some 
mortgages with good collateral for example have lower risk weight (as low as 0% 




risk weight in the former case), while an unsecured business loan or credit card 
loans have higher risk weight (as high as 100% sometimes). The risk weighted 
assets are then calculated by multiplying the volume of the credit with the risk 
weight percentage. For example, if you issue a credit worth 100 SEK, and the risk 
weight is 50%, then 50 SEK is regarded as risk weighted assets. In Basel I, the 
minimum requirement for this ratio was 8% for tier 1 and 2 capital (Siskos, 2019). 
Tier 1 capital represents the core capital of a bank, such as equity and retained 
earnings (Barrell et.al. 2011). Tier 2 capital on the other hand consists of perpetual 
deferable debt, revaluation reserves from assets, and subordinated debt. Basel II, 
which was introduced in 2004, retained the minimum capital requirement ratio of 
8% but focused on strengthening the capital requirement by further defining the risk 
weight on different types of loans. Basel II also introduced 3 pillars of risk 
management. Pillar 1 defines capital requirements, pillar 2 is an internal review 
process for the bank and pillar 3 focused on market discipline among the banks 
using the framework (Atkinson & Blundell-Wignall, 2010). The third set of 
regulations produced by the Basel Committee, commonly named Basel III, was 
introduced following the financial crisis of 2008 (Siskos, 2019). Basel I and Basel 
II had failed to create enough resilience among the banks to withstand the crisis, 
and so the Basel Committee proposed changes to the framework (BCBS, 2009). 
The minimum total capital requirement level is still 8%, but the new framework 
states that most of the tier 1 capital should consist of common shares and retained 
earnings. There is also a further definition on what should not be considered equity 
for the purpose of meeting the minimum capital requirement. Among what should 
not be considered equity are for example goodwill as it cannot be used to write of 
losses, and investments in other banks as to avoid double counting of equity over 
different banks. Basel III also increased the level of equity to RWA from 2% to 
4.5% (Byres, 2012). This should not be confused with the tier 1 and 2 capital to 
RWA ratio, as tier 1 and 2 capital consists of both the tier 1, or core, capital such as 
common equity and retained earnings, and tier 2 capital which is supplementary 
capital such as undisclosed reserves. Additionally, banks should maintain a capital 
conservation buffer consisting of common equity at 2.5% on top of the minimum 
requirements of 4.5%, making the total common equity level 7%. To sum this up, 
Basel III requires banks to hold a total of 10.5% in capital reserves. This is made 
up of the minimum capital requirement of 8%, of which 4.5% must be equity, plus 
the extra buffer of common equity of 2.5%. The focus of Basel III is therefore to 
increase the quality of the capital rather than the minimum level, as the poor quality 
of capital was a major shortcoming of the former framework (BCBS, 2009). 
Beyond the changes to capital requirements, Basel III introduced a minimum 
leverage ratio. The ratio means that banks must hold a capital to exposure ratio of 
3% (Siskos, 2019).  
 




2.2.2 Swedish Regulations 
The Swedish regulation framework for banking as well as the regulations by the 
European Union (EU) are based on the framework by The Basel Committee 
(Finansinspektionen, 2019). The importance and wide use of the Basel framework 
is further emphasised by the implementation of the framework in statutory 
regulations. The Swedish Bankers´ Association (2018) divides the Swedish 
regulatory system into three categories: capital requirements, liquidity requirements 
and resolution.  
In Basel III, the total capital requirement for a bank is 8%. The Swedish 
regulatory system uses this ratio as well but calls it basic capital requirement 
because there are additional special requirements on top of the basic requirement 
(Finansinspektionen, 2019). The requirement for a capital buffer is such an 
addition. The regulation states that banks should keep a capital buffer of 2.5% 
(above the basic capital requirement of 8%). Finansinspektionen can also issue 
demands for specific banks to retain an additional capital buffers on top of the 
buffer that applies to all banks. The first of the buffers is one that applies to banks 
that are important to the financial system in Sweden. The second one is to cover 
systematic risk that is not covered by the standard buffer. The additional buffers of 
capital are currently 1% and 3%, respectively. The Swedish banks currently 
required to retain these extra capital buffers is Swedbank, SEB and Handelsbanken. 
These banks therefore retain a total buffer 6.5% each. Quarterly, 
Finansinspektionen decides on whether a contra-cyclical capital buffer should be 
retained by the Swedish banks (Finansinspektionen, 2020). The guide value for the 
buffer size for the last quarter of 2020 was 1.7%, although the mandated buffer size 
is 0% and was for all quarters of 2020. The guide value is, simply put, a 
recommendation from the Finansinspektionen and it is not mandated. Another 
important regulation that applies to Swedish banks is the minimum risk weight for 
mortgages (Finansinspektionen, 2020). The minimum required risk weight that was 
decided in 2018 is 25% of the exposure. Since the impact on capital reserves from 
this regulation is dependent on the exposure of the individual bank, the addition to 
the minimal capital requirement is not a general percentage that applies to all banks. 
Swedish Bankers’ Association (2018) estimates the extra capital requirement from 
the risk weight minimum to be 75 billion SEK, which would mean an extra 2.5 % 
of capital. With all the additional buffers, the Swedish regulatory system requires a 
minimum of 16.5% capital to RWA (18.2% if you add in the guide value for contra-
cyclical buffer). The difference in size between the Swedish framework and the 
frameworks by the Basel committee is displayed in figure 1.  
Swedish Bankers´ Association (2018) says that a low level of liquidity was more 
harmful to the banks than the lack of sufficient capital during the 2008 crisis. In the 
light of this, Sweden implemented regulations on liquidity in 2013. The standards 
are based on a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) that dictates that a certain part of 




the assets within a bank must be liquid. As of 2018, the LCR of Swedish banks is 
15-20% according to Swedish Bankers´ Association (2018). The purpose of the 
LCR is that banks should be able to survive in short term, not a long-lasting 
recession.  
The last category identified by the Swedish Bankers´ Association is resolution. 
Because of the heavy price paid by the government and taxpayers following the 
crisis of 2008, EU presented directives of how to handle future crises (Riksgälden, 
2019). The Swedish government gave Riksgälden in 2016 the authority to take 
control of a bank in crisis under the so-called resolutionsregelverket (resolution 
regulations). An important aspect of the resolution regulations is the Minimum 
Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) (Swedish Bankers´ 
Association, 2018).  The MREL allows Riksgälden to convert some of the bank's 
liabilities into new shares. What this essentially means is that institutions that owns 
liabilities in a bank affected by this at the time of the crisis becomes owners instead 
of lenders. This process ensures that the ones held financially responsible for the 
bank during a crisis is the owners and lenders, not the taxpayers.  The size of the 
MREL is based on the capital requirements issued by Finansinspektionen, and 
additionally only applies to systematically important banks (Riksgälden, 2019). If 
MREL fails to protect a systematically important bank during a crisis, an additional 
reserve can be used (Swedish Bankers´ Association, 2018). The reserve is 
structured as a fund where banking institutions must pay a fee to build up a 
percentage of the banks collective guaranteed deposits. As mentioned, this reserve 
can only be used for a bank after lenders and owners have been held financially 
responsible to some extent as per the MREL (Riksgälden, 2021). 
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2.3 Managing the Crisis  
Regulations regarding capital ratio and liquidity can be viewed as measures that 
happen before a crisis. If we compare regulations such as those issued by the Basel 
Committee and the statutory Swedish regulations, with the three schools of 
definition by Duchek (2019) they would be applicable within the third school, 
anticipation. With the exception of the resolution-category of the Swedish 
regulations, both frameworks are designed to prevent damages from a crisis or 
prevent it altogether (even certain parts of resolution, namely the collective reserve, 
are preventative). To fully understand resilience, concepts and regulations 
regarding the first school (resistance and recovery) and the second school 
(adaptation) must be included.  
Crisis management, similar to regulations, serve to help lessen the damages from 
crises and general threats against a firm (Shrivastava, 1993). Crisis management 
incorporates the three schools of resilience as crisis management theory focuses on 
the entire process of dealing with a crisis. Alpaslan et.al. (2009), for example, 
identifies two phases of crisis management from a stakeholder perspective. The first 
phase, preparation, revolves around preventing potential crises from happening. 
Regulations that serve to prevent the damages of a financial crisis can therefore be 
placed in this phase. Response is the second phase, and this is when loss 
minimisation is in focus. In this phase, regulations dictating what happens when 
damage is already done, i.e., MREL, are relevant. Bundy et.al. (2017) divide crisis 
management into three different phases instead, where precrisis prevention is the 
first, crisis management the second, and postcrisis outcomes the third stage. In the 
research of Bundy et.al. (2017), the first and second stage coincides with what 
Alpaslan et.al (2009) describe in the two phases: preparation being equal to 
precrisis prevention, and response to crisis management. The third stage, postcrisis 
outcomes, emphasises organisational learning as part of an outcome of a crisis 
(Bundy et.al., 2017). This stage captures the essence of the second school of 
research on resilience, adaptation.  
 
 
2.4 Organisation Culture 
The purpose of including organisation culture in the theory chapter of this thesis is 
to understand how the organisation culture can affect the actions of an organisation 
as a whole. Organisation wide mentalities such as risk aversion or a shared drive 
for profit may affect the resilience of the organisation. It is therefore important to 
understand the concept before analysing what factors define the resilience of 
Handelsbanken.  




An interesting definition of organisational culture is defined by Martins & 
Martins (2007:380-381) as a “system of shared meaning held by members, 
distinguishing the organisation from other organisations.”. As the Martins & 
Martins (2007) note, this seems to be the general agreement. What is interesting 
about the aforementioned definition is the further expansion of it. The definition is 
expanded into seven characteristics that can be more or less prevalent in an 
organisation. The seven characteristics are as follows: Innovation and risk-taking 
(1), attention to detail (2), outcome orientation (3), people orientation (4), team 
orientation (5), aggressiveness (6), and stability (7). These characteristics can be 
combined, with any characteristic being more or less prevalent, to create a diverse 
culture in any organisation. Organisational culture being a multi-layered concept is 
further strengthened by Sinclair (1993). Aside from the shared values in an 
organisation, which the characteristics priorly mentioned can be described as, less 
deep-rooted aspects of organisational culture such as symbols and arrangements 
can define an organisations culture. Sinclair (1993) also discusses the ability of an 
organisation to change and steer the culture within itself. The reason it would be 
hard for an organisation to influence its own culture is because essentials of a 
culture come from national, racial and religious cultures. On the other hand, 
organisational membership seems to influence the behaviour of individuals, clearly 
showing that organisations, unwittingly or not, influence the culture. The influence 
on employees is further discussed by Jarratt & O’Neill (2002), where it is stated 
that organisation culture influences the behaviour of managers and the perception 
of employees towards an organisation.  




This chapter of the thesis will consist of the methods used to achieve the results.  
The first section motivates the choice of method. The second section describes the 
method used in detail. The final section focuses on the quality criteria of the 
method.  
3.1 Research Method 
The method used in this study is a qualitative one consisting of primary data 
collection in the form of semi-structured interviews, and secondary data collection 
in the form of a literature review. This part of the chapter serves to motivate the 
choice of method.  
3.1.1 Interviews 
The choice of a qualitative method is based on its suitability to the focus of this 
study. The aim of the study is to deduce what makes Handelsbanken resilient to 
financial crises. Within qualitative research, interviews are the most common form 
of data collection (Bryman & Bell, 2017). In general, interviews allow for a certain 
degree of flexibility in the collection of data compared to a qualitative method based 
on a survey. The interviews conducted in this study are semi-structured. A 
structured interview starts from defined questions, much like a survey, but with 
room for more nuanced answers. On the other hand, an unstructured interview does 
not start in a set of questions, but rather resemble a conversation around a set topic. 
A qualitative study based on semi-structured interviews allows the study to deep-
search both the hard and the soft values that the defines the resilience of an 
organisation. The use of set questions with the opportunity to elaborate on the 
answers means that new findings and questions whose relevance were previously 
unknown to the interviewer can be explored. According to Hennik et.al. (2020), 
interviews are most commonly used when the study aims to identify the emotions 
and personal beliefs of people. Although these values can be used to explain the 
resilience of an organisation (organisation culture for example), the purpose of the 
interviews for this study is to collect data on decision making and factors of 
resilience within Handelsbanken. Hennik et.al. (2020) also note that interviews are 
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suitable to extract information about decision-making and in-depth information 
about sensitive subjects, bank information for example.  
 
3.1.2 Literature Review 
To produce a study of this sort, the first step is to create a sufficient understanding 
of the topic chosen as a study needs to be based on existing knowledge (Rowley & 
Slack, 2004). Before the data collecting, the author must build a knowledge as to 
understand what type of data is necessary for the study. Another important aspect 
that a literature review brings to a study is the ability to synthesise a research area 
that may be disagreeing or fractured; and help find the gaps in that research (Snyder, 
2019). Snyder (2019) mentions that a literature review is a good way to answer 
research questions. The literature review in this thesis was used to formulate the 
theoretical framework and identify the results of similar studies to compare the 
results of this study to existing research.  
 
3.2 Research design 
This part of the chapter explains the approach to the research method. How the 
interviews were prepared for, conducted, and how the data was processed. Further, 
it explains the way the literature review was conducted.  
 
3.2.1 Interview Design 
To study the resilience of Handelsbanken as an organisation and identify the factors 
that makes Handelsbanken resilient to the negative effects of financial crises, the 
interviewees were chosen based on their position in the organisation. To make sure 
the interviewees could represent the organisation, possess insight in the 
organisation culture of Handelsbanken and simultaneously be senior enough to see 
the organisation from a large perspective, branch managers were chosen for the 
interviews. Branch managers represent their individual branch and work closely to 
the loan administrators. In that regard, they should have insight in the organisation 
culture of an office but also be able to understand whether this culture is 
representative of a single office or the entire organisation. Further, they should be 
able to view the organisation as a whole, as they are the bridge between the branch 
and corporate. By interviewing three branch managers, the data will show whether 
the perception of resilience in Handelsbanken differs between branches. Likewise, 
similar answers will help to highlight the most important aspects of resilience. 
Further, for the purpose of broadening the result and ensuring that the study does 




not overlook any important factors, the number of people chosen to be interviewed 
was three.  
Due to the timing of this study (the ongoing pandemic), interviews in person are 
not professional or even realistic. The first two interviews were therefore conducted 
via Zoom to make them as personal as possible given the circumstances. The aspect 
of a face-to-face interview (via Zoom) that is lacking when an interview is 
conducted over phone is the ability for the interviewer to watch the interviewees 
reaction to a question, both the facial reaction and body language to an extent 
(Bryman & Bell, 2017). Due to technical issues the third interview had to be 
conducted over the phone, but as the nature of these interviews were not to evaluate 
certain body language or reactions, this should not affect the quality of the 
interview. A positive aspect of the phone interview was the lack of delay, which 
was a minor issue in both Zoom-interviews. Although the delay was only a 
nuisance, the absence of it proved to make the interview more flexible and allowed 
for more natural follow up questions from the interviewer.  
All three interviews followed the same basic structure. The interviews were 
based on a series of questions. These questions can be found in an appendix 
(appendix 1). Prior to each interview, each participant received a shortened version 
of the question series with the purpose of giving them time to prepare for the 
questions and be able to answer more in-depth. The shortened version can also be 
found in an appendix (appendix 2). As the interviews were semi-structured and 
explorative, the questions only served to steer the interviews. Much of the data 
retrieved and used from the interviews were not directly tied to any question, but 
rather the result of follow-up questions or the interviewee explaining on a free base. 
Nonetheless, in all three interviews, the questions were more often than not the 
starting point for data collecting in the interviews and all interviewees were asked 
all the questions in appendix 1. All interviews were conducted in Swedish as that is 
the first language of all interviewees as well as the interviewer and would 
realistically provide a more natural conversation and possibility of in-depth 
discussion of financial terms that the interviewees might not know the English 
translation for. All data from the interviews was therefore translated into English 
before presented in the thesis.  
The first two interviews were recorded, and the recordings partly transcribed. 
They were not fully transcribed as some of the information from the interviews 
were not relevant to the study. The summarised transcriptions were thereafter sent 
to the interviewees for approval before the data was used in the study. 
Unfortunately, the phone interview could not be recorded, but active notetaking and 
clarification during the interview solved this problem. Instead of receiving a 
summarized transcription for approval, the third interviewee received a note-
summary of the interview. All interviewees approved the use of the data from 
respective interview.  






This section of the chapter serves to introduce the participants of the conducted 
interviews. Each participant is a branch manager but their history within 
Handelsbanken differs.  
The first interview took place on April 20th, 2021. The participant was Jens 
Fransson. Jens is the branch manager of Handelsbanken’s office in Nyköping, 
Sweden. He has worked in the organisation since 1990, and in his current position 
for the last eight years. During his 31 years in Handelsbanken he has held three 
branch manager positions as well as head of credits for the organisations branch in 
Luxembourg. Because of his long and varied career in Handelsbanken, he has good 
insight in the organisation and worked within Handelsbanken during both of the 
crises mentioned in this thesis.  
The second interview was held on April 21st, 2021. This interview was held with 
Micael Lindström, the branch manager of Handelsbanken’s office in Uppsala City. 
He has been in his current office for 2.5 years but has worked as the manager of 
three other branches in succession since 2007. Further, he has been an employee of 
Handelsbanken for a total of 20 years. Just like Jens Fransson, his many years in 
the organisation makes him an excellent participant in this study, as he is well 
versed in the organisation and has witnessed the 2008 crisis from the perspective of 
a branch manager.  
The third and final interview in this study was conducted on April 29th, 2021. 
The interviewee was Lars Olsson who is the branch manager or Handelsbanken’s 
office in Enköping, Sweden. He has worked for over 30 years in the organisation 
and as a branch manager for a total of 15 years, 8 of which he has been in his current 
position. Like previously mentioned participants, he has been in the organisation 
for a long time, making him very suitable for this study. Just like Jens Fransson, his 
more than 30 years in Handelsbanken means that he has witnessed both crises, and 
his long career as a branch manager speaks for his insight in both the organisation 
as a whole and the more localized aspects of an individual office.  
3.3 Quality Criteria 
Quality criteria is important in research because of the risk of randomness and 
arbitrariness in the research (Steinke, 2004). The same criteria used in quantitative 
research cannot be used when conducting qualitative research such as interviews, 
as has been used in this study. Lincoln & Guba (1985) argues that specific criteria 
be used in qualitative research. The criteria used in this study is credibility, 




transferability, dependability, and confirmability, as constructed by Lincoln & 
Guba (1985).  
3.3.1 Credibility 
Creating credibility in qualitative research means to make the data acceptable to 
others by ensuring that the research has been conducted correctly (Bryman & Bell, 
2017). Two common methods to create credibility in a study is by employing 
triangulation, and respondent validation. To fulfill this criterion in this thesis, three 
interviews have been conducted as to create triangulation. Further, respondent 
validation was employed by sending the transcription to each participant for 
approval before analysis, to ensure that the data collected was correct and not 
misinterpreted.  
3.3.2 Transferability 
This criterion is based on how well the results are applicable to different context 
and environments (Bryman & Bell, 2017). Transferability can be increased by 
providing a detailed description of the context and participants of an interview 
(Shenton, 2004). In this study, the circumstances and the interviewees are presented 
and discussed in the method chapter. 
3.3.3 Dependability 
Reliability in quantitative research is comparable to dependability in qualitative 
research (Guest et.al. 2014). Dependability means that the different phases of a 
research method are correctly conducted and describes, as to increase replicability. 
Guest et.al. (2014) states, however, that replicability in a qualitative study is not as 
important as it is in a quantitative study, due to the flexible nature of interviews. To 
address the criterion of dependability, the different phases of the method in this 
study has been described and the questions found in appendix 1 has been the basis 
for the primary data collection in the study. 
3.3.4 Confirmability 
Confirmability measures how affected the results of a study are by the researcher’s 
own bias (Bryman & Bell, 2017). Because complete objectivity is not possible in a 
qualitative method, it is important, in this study, to avoid letting your own 
conclusions and beliefs seep into the results of the interviews.  
 




The fourth chapter of this thesis will be a detailed summary of the data collected 
from the interviews. This is the primary data to be analysed in chapter 5, and while 
the data from the interviews is summarised, the information presented is all the 
relevant data for this study. Only data collected from the interviews will be 
presented here, and no personal conclusions by the author will be presented in 
chapter 4. The data presented will be divided into the three different schools of 
resilience, resistance and recovery, adaptation, and anticipation, so to easier 
identify the data´s value to the study. Additionally, one extra section will be used 
to sum up the data that constitute the underlying factors of creating resilience in 
Handelsbanken.    
 
4.1 Interview 1 
Before going into detail, it is important to note that while Jens worked in 
Handelsbanken during the crisis of the early 90s, his memory of the crisis is a bit 
vague due to it taking place nearly 30 years ago. However, regarding the 2008 crisis, 
his memory is more vivid.  
Resistance and Recovery 
Jens means that the most important thing for Handelsbanken to do after a crisis, is 
to simply carry on a usual. Because Handelsbanken was not affected by the crises 
in the same manner as competitors, the need for major recovery was not necessary. 
Instead, Handelsbanken focuses on continuous quality in their business, something 
that should be prevalent regardless of an economic recession or boom. Further, Jens 
states that Handelsbanken wants to participate in the “super-market” that follows a 
crisis as this is when Handelsbanken historically is valued the highest compared to 
competitors. However, Jens emphasises that doing so can bring great risk. 
Ultimately Handelsbanken wants a business that can handle risks, although the risks 
can be hard to see before it is too late. To support the statement that Handelsbanken 
historically has practiced a “business as usual” approach, Jens states that his credit 
mandate as a branch manager remained unchanged after the 2008 crisis. As a branch 
manager Jens is assigned a certain credit mandate. The credit mandate represents 
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In terms of adapting to the crises, Handelsbanken as an organisation has not 
changed to any larger extent. He adds that their internal collection of instructions 
and guidelines may have changed but, again, not in any large forms. One example 
of changes to reduce exposure that followed the crisis of 2008 is the changes in the 
lending to housing cooperatives. Only a couple of years ago, housing cooperatives 
were generally highly mortgaged. On top of this, the discount rate for the mortgages 
were low. Exploiters of this had a high mortgage per square meter and a low 
discount rate on the mortgage, leading to the apartments in the cooperative 
becoming cheaper for residents. This reached a level where Handelsbanken had to 
make restrictions, meaning lower limits to the mortgage per square meter, and a 
higher, more realistic discount rate on the mortgage. These adjustments were 
internal changes from Handelsbanken, but Jens notes that other banks made similar 
adjustments roughly at the same time.  
 
Anticipation 
Regarding additional regulations on top of the statutory ones, Jens states that they 
do not have any on a local level. In the office however, they work with risk 
reduction in an extensive manner. Jens describes that he works with risk and 
resilience by trust in his surroundings. He distributes his mandate among 
individuals on his office, so that they can make decisions regarding lending on their 
own. Although the decision is theirs to make, it must always be checked by a 
colleague, through the so called “four-eyes principle”. As the branch manager, Jens 
also performs a quality control on credits on a monthly basis, but not directly prior 
to payment of the credit. During this control, he assesses whether there are any 
irregularities, or whether anything looks good or bad. Finally, Handelsbanken 
works by a rating system. This system is applicable to both private customers as 
well as corporate customers although it differs some between the two different 
groups. Private customers are rated from 1-5, where 1 is the best and 5 is the worst. 
Customers with a worse rating experiences more follow up on a monthly basis and 
are more closely reviewed. The system for corporate customers is also based on the 
1-5 scale, but instead measure two variables. These variables are the risk for 
financial strain and the financial resilience. In this case, a 1-1 rating is the best and 
a 5-5 rating is the worst. Corporate customers with a worse rating also experience 
a follow up on a monthly basis. In both private and corporate cases, this follow up 
is a way to find solutions to the problems. On the question of whether this system 




is unique for Handelsbanken, Jens answered that although he is not certain, he 
guesses that other banks work more with scoring based on a computerised system, 
as opposed to Handelsbanken where these ratings are made by the local office. 
Another important aspect in reducing risk is the way branch managers are 
evaluated. There is no bonus or commission for earning more money from one year 
to another but he managers are rather mainly measured on earnings compared to 
costs, and customer satisfaction. Jens describes this as being measured on how 
stable his business is growing.  
 
Underlying Factors 
Something that is unique for Handelsbanken is their closeness to the customer, both 
in a literal and figurative sense. Handelsbanken has by far the most individual 
offices of the large banks in Sweden and more or less at least one office in all 
counties in Sweden. Jens describes that what sets Handelsbanken apart from the 
competition the most is the organisation culture that can be seen throughout the 
entire organisation. The culture revolves around being close to the customer. The 
philosophy of Handelsbanken is that by making the decisions close to the market, 
knowing the customer and generally conducting business in a very decentralised 
way, credit losses will be smaller. According to Jens, this has also been generally 
true since 1973 when this doctrine was introduced. As a branch manager, Jens is 
expected to live within the active area of the branch, as to be closer to his market. 
He states that it is important to know your market and believes that it is better to 
know you market and customer and making local decisions rather than making 
these decisions geographically far from the market. Further, there is a strong culture 
in the organisation to protect the bank and the shareholders of the bank, and that 
this loyalty is shared among his peers in other offices. A testament to the risk 
aversion of Handelsbanken is the fact that they refrained from entering the Baltic 
market, as they deemed it too risky.  
 
4.2 Interview 2 
Since Micael did not work in Handelsbanken during the financial crisis in the early 
90s, all references to a crisis in this section refers to the financial crisis of 2008.  
Resistance and Recovery 
Regarding how Handelsbanken acted after the crisis, Micael explains that they kept 
on working as they had always done. Their judgement is unchanged both regarding 
risk management and lending. He adds that the office where he worked at did not 
lose that much money. They managed customers individually, did risk-assessments 
and supported the economically important. In the event that a customer poses a 




problem for the bank, they offer extra help.  If the individual assessment of a 
customer show that there is a risk, they act in time to minimise losses, or help the 
customer recover. They rarely cancel credits but instead try to find a solution 
through a dialogue with the customer.  
 
Adaptation 
Micael describes the biggest changes after the crisis as the statutory regulations on 
banking. Within the organisation, the basics are the same, although their internal 
guidelines have been updated. In general, the processes for decision-making are 
remains the same and their credit-policy is the same. The larger changes mentioned 
are tied to capital requirements and prices and rates for the customer. Before the 
crisis, the rate was more or less independent of the size of the credit as well as the 
financial strength of the customer.  
 
Anticipation 
Micael states that the upper management of Handelsbanken has decided that the 
bank should hold capital that is 1-3 % over the required minimum set by the 
Finansinspektionen. He is not sure about the exact percentage, but the reason for it 
is that Handelsbanken never wants to be in a position where the taxpayers must bail 
them out through governmental support. He emphasises that this mentality is 
important throughout the bank, that they never want to be a burden to the taxpayers. 
He also adds that they have chosen to do this despite it negatively affecting their 
profitability. Further, Handelsbanken has a dialogue with the Finansinspektionen 
about how Handelsbanken calculates how much capital they put in reserves when 
issuing a loan, all approved by Finansinspektionen, of course. The calculation 
differs depending on the financial strength of a corporate customer. Micael adds 
that he is not sure about the details of this. While he is not entirely sure, he adds 
that he thinks Handelsbanken differs from the other large banks in Sweden in this.  
In the office, Micael as the branch manager is the person that holds the credit 
mandate. This is then distributed to the employees so that they themselves can make 
credit decisions. He does not have his own clients and are rarely involved in 
customer meetings. He is involved in business with the larger customers, but the 
employees are for example expected to be able to handle mortgage credits 
themselves. If the volume of a credit is larger than the credit mandate an employee 
is assigned, Micael must approve, as he holds the largest mandate in his office. If 
the volume is greater than even Micael’s mandate, the credit is sent to the next 
instance. He adds to this that 95% of their business is within his mandate limit. 
They have control function as well, where the method differs from sampling to full 
control, depending on the individual case. Micael checks his deputies, who in turn 




check the employees. Micael is checked by his immediate supervisor, and so on. 
Additionally, Micael makes a risk report every quarter, where he goes through late 
payers and possible issues among customers. If he decides that there is a risk, the 
office handles it locally. On top of this, each office has an audit rating, where each 
office is measured on how well organised the branch is. Micael himself is not 
measured on volume, but rather on basis of customer satisfaction and the 
cost/income ratio of the office. The reason for this method is that the markets differ 
for each office. In Uppsala, there is a strong market for mortgages and financially 




Handelsbanken is built around the branches. The heart of the decentralisation is that 
the branches are the bank, and this mentality permeates the entire organization. The 
branch managers are given high autonomy as long as they work within their area of 
activity. Handelsbanken believes in local decision making and issues and risks are 
dealt with by the local branch. Although he is unsure, he believes that business is 
done differently among competitors. Their offices are organised differently, and 
decisions are made differently. Risk issues are handles by a separate body within 
the organization, as compared to Handelsbanken where the affected branch deals 
with the issue at hand. He emphasises that this is what he thinks, but he has not seen 
the entire picture. This is tied to the culture of Handelsbanken. They are risk averse 
to the core because any loss is directly negative to the result. They must understand 
the case and the client, and always have collateral. This mentality and policy are 
shared among all branches. The basis for the organisation is that they must not take 
any risks in lending, and that has been the basis for 50 years. Historically, Micael 
notes that Handelsbanken is outstanding in terms of credit losses, and this is 
credited to the decentralisation. He adds that if you are close to the customer, you 
know the customer. One important choice in terms of risk was that Handelsbanken 
decided not to enter the Baltic market, as they did not deem it safe enough. They 
had branches in the Baltic but only to support Swedish customers, they did not run 
any banking in the Baltic market.  
 
4.3 Interview 3 
Lars has worked over 30 years in Handelsbanken, meaning that he has experienced 
both the financial crisis of the early 90s as well as the crisis of 2008. Just like Jens 
Fransson, his memories are more vivid of the 2008-crisis than the crisis in the 90s. 
Despite this some information presented in this section refers to the crisis of the 
early 90s, although most refers to the crisis of 2008.  




Resistance and Recovery 
After the crisis of 2008, Lars cannot recall that Handelsbanken took any specific 
measures to recover. The market changed temporarily because of the crisis and 
resulted in less issued credits and increased austerity to a certain degree. He adds 
that a support was extended to some clients in need in the form om loans, as a way 
of helping said clients survive. Lars credits Handelsbanken’s success in both crises 
to their policy of working close to the market. Other banks were issuing credits to 
markets geographically far from them, but Handelsbanken was adamant in the 
decision to handle local business locally. The real estate crisis of the 90s was rough, 
but they pulled through. The global crisis of 2008 was also rough, but they pulled 
through. They know their customers; they know the market and they try to support 
and help both private and corporate customers in time.  
 
Adaptation 
Because of EU-directives, a lot has changed since the 2008 crisis. Lars states that it 
is evident that there are regulations in place to prevent banks from failing. 
Internally, Lars notes that there is a big difference from 15 years ago. There is a 
more thorough analysis of numbers than before and more checks from different 
people in the office. It is not as easy to approve a credit as when he first started. 
There are more steps to reach a decision today. He explains that despite no major 
changes were made after the crisis, more caution naturally is practiced today.  
 
Anticipation 
Risk avoidance is big in Handelsbanken. The mentality surrounding lending is not 
focused on making money. The most important thing is to get the lent money back. 
At the slightest uncertainty, they sometimes must make the decisions to deny the 
application for credit. The decision is considered from person to person, and they 
always make the decision based on a calculation. Anybody at the office is mandated 
to issue credits. As the branch manager, Lars is the one with the credit mandate and 
he decides the mandate volume of the employees. The majority of the credits in the 
office is within Lars’s mandate, and if the volume is greater than his mandate, they 
are sent to the next instance above him. Every branch works exclusively within their 
own area. If a customer moves, their business is sent to the branch working within 
the customers new area. His market is Enköping, and because the exclusivity, every 
branch knows their local market well. Because of differing markets, the day-to-day 
business can differ between different branches. The policy at Handelsbanken has 
always been that repayment capacity is number one, and collateral is number two 
in terms of importance. Regarding the individual branches, Lars states that the 
branch manager is supposed to run their own office. They do not have free credit 




mandate, but they have relatively high autonomy. On an organisational level, Lars 
mentions that the board of Handelsbanken should keep an extra 1-2% in capital 
buffer on top of statutory requirements.  
 
Underlying Factors 
Lars ties the culture of Handelsbanken much to the credit policy that the 
organisation works from. The managers are expected to run their own office, and 
you should know your market. They want to be close to the market and know their 
customers. The Enköping branch is a mid-sized office, and on a smaller market like 
Enköping, they know their customers well. You are, however, not allowed to be too 
close to the customer, he adds. If you know the customer too well or they are a 
relative, they are sent to another administrator. They know their market, they stick 
to their market, they stick to the policy.  
 




This chapter will consist of the analysis. This is where the empirical data presented 
in chapter 4 will be analysed with the help of the theory from chapter 2, to reach 
the answers to my research question: “What factors make Handelsbanken resilient 
to the negative effects of a financial crisis?”. 
A major part of the theoretical framework that has been used to gather and label 
the empirical data from the interviews has been the three different schools of 
resilience recognised by Duchek (2019). In the pursuit to answer the question of 
what makes Handelsbanken resilient, these different schools of study have helped 
categorise the data to make it easier to compare the data from all three interviews 
and create standardised results. To better illustrate the results, the findings in 
chapter 4 have been put into a table (table 1) so that the findings from all three 
interviews can be compared to each other. Table 1 illustrates the data from all 
interviews summarised in certain phrases and categorised into the corresponding 
school of resilience, as well as what the author of this study categorises as 
underlying factors to resilience. The purpose of doing this is to better illustrate how 
similar or dissimilar the data from all three interviews are. The phrases are 
simplifications of what the interviewees said, and no two interviewees phrased their 
answer in the exact same way. Further, phrases that are shared among multiple 
interviews may not always have been answered to the same exact question. The 
content of table 1 will be explained further in section 5.1-5.4. 
  
5. Analysis 








5.1. Resistance and Recovery 
The results that are categorised in the first section, resistance and recovery, are 
often tied to questions about how Handelsbanken managed the crises, and more 
specifically what Handelsbanken did to recover from the crisis. All three branch 
managers agreed that very little was done in terms of resisting the recession of 2008. 
The recollection among the participants regarding the events following the crisis of 
the early 90s is slim, but the answer remains the same when asked about that crisis. 
All three interviewees explained that there never was any need to take drastic 
actions. The policy and culture of the bank that surrounds closeness to clients and 
market put Handelsbanken in a position where they did not require governmental 
aid, as opposed to competitors. Duchek (2019) describes this school of resilience 
as the ability to respond to unexpected negative changes and quickly return to status 
quo. Based on this description, the lack of extraordinary action by Handelsbanken 
following an immediate crisis could be viewed as a lack of resilience. However, 
Handelsbanken came out of both crises very strong simply by carrying on as before. 




 -Continue like before 
 -Focus on quality
 -Continue like before
 -Support clients in need
 -No specific measures to 
recover
 -Support clients in need
Adaptation
 -No major organisational 
changes
 -Updates to guidelines
 -Increased precision in different 
cases
 -No major organisational 
changes 
 -Updated to guidelines
 -Increased precision in different 
cases
 -No major organisational 
changes
 -More caution is practiced 
today
 -Increased preicsion in different 
cases
 -More steps to reach a decision
Anticipation
 -Trust in surrounding
 -Multi-layered control
 -Monthly control 
 -Unique rating system
 -Stability-based evaluation of 
employees
  -Capital buffer on top of        
statuatory requirement
 -Never burden the tax-payer
 -Unique method for calculating 
capital buffer
 -Trust in sorrounding
 -Multi-layered control
 -Quarterly risk report
 -Audit rating of different offices
 -Stability-based evaluation of 
employees
 -Trust in surrounding
 -Focus on getting money back, 
not volume
 -Practice caution 
Underlying 
factors
 -Knowing your customer
 -Closeness to market
 -Local decisions
 -Strong culture to protect bank
 -High autonomy within local 
market
 -Risk-averse culture
 -Knowing your customer
 -Local decisions
 -High autonomy within local 
market
 -Closeness to market
 -Knowing your customer
 -Local decisions




The crisis management theory by Alpaslan (2009) divides crisis management into 
two phases, one of them being response. In terms of response to a crisis and loss 
minimisation, two of the interviews described that supporting clients in need was 
important. It is evident by the collected data that this practice always is used, not 
only during crises. One can assume, however, that a crisis calls for more support of 
clients than is necessary during calmer times.  
 
5.2 Adaptation 
When comparing the answers categorised as adaptation, the result is again very 
uniform. None of the participants have experienced any broader organisational 
changes related to the crisis of 2008. Handelsbanken has, however, updated their 
guidelines and most notably changed the way they evaluate different cases. The 
changes that Handelsbanken as an organisation has implemented post-crisis, is on 
an office level. Lars Olsson describes this as an increased caution in general. 
Although the other two participants did not explicitly state the increased caution, 
this is in line with how they describe the increased precision in lending. The concept 
of adaptation in research about resilience is described by Duchek (2019) as an 
organisation learning from their mistakes and coming out of a crisis stronger than 
before. As shown, Handelsbanken has made changes to the guidelines post-crisis. 
Details of exactly what these changes imply is unclear, but the changes such as 
increased precision in lending and general increase in caution when conducting 
business is perhaps to be interpreted as part of these guideline changes. All three 
interviewees emphasise that the most notable changes were the increased 
restrictions on banking imposed by the EU and the Swedish government. These 
changes are off course not credited to Handelsbanken, but as a regulated bank, 
Handelsbanken are undoubtedly affected by the increased restrictions and the 
restrictions contribute to the overall resilience of Handelsbanken.  
 
5.3 Anticipation 
The area of resilience where all three interviewees could provide most detail and 
unique answers is in anticipation. Because of the relatively high autonomy of 
individual offices, it is possible that certain practices differ among branches, for 
example the execution and frequency of risk reports and controls. It is important to 
note that no such information has been stated by any of the participants, and the 
different answers could be referring to, in aforementioned example, entirely 
different reports. Anticipation is described by Duchek (2019) as what an 




organisation does to avoid a crisis entirely. Most of the data collected that is relevant 
to resilience fits in this category. All interviewees described that risk avoidance was 
something they worked with on a daily basis. The managers are not evaluated based 
on how much money they bring into the bank, but instead on how stable their 
business is growing. Off course cost/income ratio is dependent on making money, 
but chasing volume is, as described, not relevant for an office in Handelsbanken.  
What is described as “trust in surrounding”, in Table 1 is the distribution of credit 
mandate to employees by the branch managers. Instead of having everything go 
through one channel and needing the branch manager to sign off on every issued 
credit, employees are encouraged to make their own decisions. In an organisation 
that is so focused on knowing the customer and the market, perhaps this is a way to 
ensure that more insight is gained in individual cases. A branch manager dealing 
with 100 cases are likely not as invested in the individual customers as an employee 
dealing with just 10 cases. It is hard to evaluate whether this is a factor of resilience 
or not, but Handelsbanken’s numbers speak for themselves.  
The first phase of crisis management called precrisis prevention by Bundy et.al. 
(2017) and the first phase, preparation, by Alpaslan et.al. (2009) capture the essence 
of anticipative resilience and is described in both cases as measures to prevent a 
crisis from occurring. Although this section is dedicated to such measures, one of 
the most notable measure taken by Handelsbanken is the extra capital buffer they 
have. On top of the already high capital requirements imposed by Sweden and EU, 
Handelsbanken has chosen to hold an additional 1-3% of capital in reserves. As the 
managers do not work with these kinds of things, their knowledge is limited as to 
exactly how large this extra buffer is. Realistically, this would be in line with the 
guide value of the contra-cyclical buffer issued by Finansinspektionen which was 
at 1.7% the last quarter (Finansinspektionen, 2020). Whether this this is the correct 
value or not, however, cannot be established in this study. Based on the regulations 
imposed by the EU and the Swedish government, the prevalence of capital buffers 
can be interpreted as these being one of the most important measures to prevent a 
crisis in a bank.  
 
5.4 Underlying Factors 
The reason for this fourth category is that some data collected does not fall into any 
of the three categories by Duchek (2009). This data is as the categories name 
reveals, the factors that influence the resilience of Handelsbanken. It is in this 
category that the organisational culture of Handelsbanken is put, as well as the 
policy that inspires this culture. Arguably, the policy could be categorised in 
anticipation, but because of its connectedness with the culture it is instead put in 
the same category. The policy of the bank has for some 50 years been to work close 




to the market. With this follows an increased knowledge of the market and the 
customer. In all three interviews, this factor was emphasised the most as the root of 
Handelsbanken’s resilience. By keeping the decision-making close to the market, 
Handelsbanken gains increased knowledge of the customer and conditions on the 
local market which allows for a more precise evaluation of a case. All three 
interviewees describe this as part of the culture in the organisation. Jens and Lars 
more so, directly describing the culture as being close to the customer and the 
market. Micael describes it more as being risk-averse in general, but also that being 
close to the customer is important in all cases. Sinclair (1993) discusses the ability 
of an organisation to steer the internal culture in a certain direction, and that the 
culture can be hard to affect due to the culture being tied to more deep-rooted 
factors. As all data shows that Handelsbanken’s policy is strongly connected to its 
organisational culture, it seems like Handelsbanken has succeeded in steering its 
internal culture, at least in terms of what affects resilience. 
 




In this chapter, the results of the study will be discussed and compared to the results 
from other studies. Because the literature review did not produce any studies of 
such a specific focus as has been assumed in this paper, studies focusing on the 
effect of the crises on Swedish banks in general will form the starting point of the 
discussion.  
Several prior studies have focused on the effects of the financial crisis on 
Swedish banks. The literature review for this study has shown an apparent lack of 
research in how banks can avoid negative effects of a financial crisis as well as what 
specific factors contribute to the resilience of a bank. Based on the evolvement of 
regulatory frameworks both after the crisis of the early 90s and most notably the 
crisis of 2008, the common consensus seems to be pointing in the direction of 
regulation frameworks as the best way to increase the resilience in a bank (Atkinson 
& Blundell-Wignall, 2010; Siskos, 2019; BCBS, 2009; Eken et.al. 2013). Also, the 
results of this study show that regulations are important in achieving resilience in a 
bank. The primary data in this study unanimously pointed out the updated 
regulation framework from the Finansinspektionen as the largest change post-crisis. 
Further, Handelsbanken retains an extra capital buffer on top of what they are 
legally required too, despite it negatively affecting their profitability. Although the 
regulation framework is not unique to Handelsbanken, it is undoubtedly an 
important factor that contributes to their resilience. It is also worth noting here that 
Handelsbanken calculates their capital reserves differently than the competitors, 
and this difference could perhaps be crucial, although this has not been discussed 
in this study, due to the information being unconfirmed. This said, regulations based 
on capital buffers has yet to prove their effectiveness in a crisis. In the case of the 
Basel regulations, they have never effectively protected a bank in a financial crisis. 
The framework did not exist in the 90s, and Basel II failed to make banks resilient 
enough during the 2008-crisis (BCBS, 2009). The most recent framework, Basel 
III, which is the basis for the EU and Swedish frameworks has yet to prove itself. 
One could argue that the absence of banking crises since 2008 is a testament to the 
effectiveness of Basel III and other capital-based frameworks. After all, although it 
should not be seen as a banking crisis, the recession in 2020 following uncertainties 
about the pandemic did not see any failures of Swedish banks. More likely than not, 
however, the absence of financial crises is due to a variety of factors and cannot be 
6.  Discussion 




credited solely to stricter regulations in banking. Another part of the regulation 
framework issued by the Finansinspektionen that is not directly tied to capital 
requirements is the resolution (Riksgälden, 2019). This part dictates the crisis 
management process of the banking system of Sweden. While the primary data 
from this study did not necessarily produce any major information about crisis 
management in Handelsbanken, the reason behind resolution is relevant. The 
framework ultimately exists to make sure that the taxpayer does not have to bail out 
a bank in a crisis. This is the same reasoning used by one of the interviewees to 
explain why Handelsbanken has chosen to maintain a capital buffer on top of what 
is statutory.  
The organisational structure is one factor, or rather a set of factors, the result 
shows as a widely contributing factor to Handelsbanken’s resilience. The bank is 
built around its offices and the policy is adamant about decisions being made 
locally. Exactly how this policy affects the resilience of Handelsbanken is hard to 
determine. It has been pointed out by the interviewees that the closeness to the 
market and customers, and the local decision making increases the precision in 
credit evaluation. The argument of the interviewees is that those who know the 
market and the client have increased insight in the individual case and can therefore 
make a more accurate risk assessment. As Jens Fransson points out, the bank has 
generally seen less credit losses since the introduction of this policy in 1973, 
speaking for the policies success. An interesting aspect of this policy is that it is 
deeply intertwined in the culture of Handelsbanken. The culture is further described 
as encouraging caution, and disliking risk. The mentality of the people who work 
at the bank is a result of what the policy seeks to achieve: caution and precision 
when issuing credits. The people working at Handelsbanken have great loyalty to 
the bank, and actively work to protect the bank and the shareholders from risk. The 
reason for discussing the importance of the culture being so centred around risk is 
that a culture can impact the behaviour of an organisation’s employees (Jarratt & 
O’Neill, 2002). A culture centred around risk avoidance can therefore prevent 
employees from taking risks, increasing the resilience of the organisation. Because 
the managers work with risk daily, this risk averse mentality is constantly in play 
and affect the decision-making processes at Handelsbanken. An example of the 
caution that was discussed in the interviews was Handelsbanken’s reluctance to 
enter the Baltic market prior to the crisis of 2008. The Baltic market was hit hard 
during the crisis (Barr & Pierrou, 2015), and the decision to stay out of it likely 
saved Handelsbanken a lot of money. This decision was obviously not taken at an 
office-level, and it is farfetched to credit this to the effectiveness of the 
decentralisation policy. It can, however, more reasonably be credited to the culture 
of the organisation, where the practice of caution is important.  
The last factor that plays a big role in the resilience of Handelsbanken is again 
made up of multiple smaller factors combined. The factor in focus is the increased 




hands-on approach. Handelsbanken has updated their guidelines regarding credit 
issuing and subsequently increased the precision of their decision making. In the 
analysis section, this is presented under the adaptation section, meaning that these 
changes and updates is a response to the financial crisis of 2008. Similarly, to how 
regulation frameworks are updated post-crisis (BCBS, 2009), it is only natural that 
the decision-making processes are updated as well, if not only to accommodate the 
increased strictness of the regulations. A way to explain the necessity of this 
accommodation is the way banks calculate the RWA. The ratio of capital to RWA 
is the basis for which the capital buffer is calculated and an increased size of the 
minimum requirement for the capital buffer affects the quality of issued credits. If 
the minimum capital requirements are low, then credits with a high risk-weight do 
not impact the capital buffer as much as if the minimum requirements are higher. 
To display this, two different scenarios have been made in the table below (Table 
2). Table 2 shows two scenarios where the minimum capital requirement is the 
same. The first four loans in both examples are identical, with the same amount, 
risk weight and subsequent contribution to RWA as the corresponding loans in the 
other example. The difference between the examples is seen in the last loan where 
only the risk weight differs: 90% in example 1, and 30% in example 2. The total 
RWA is 60 SEK higher in example 1, which in turn means that the required capital 
in example 1 is 6 SEK, or roughly 20% higher than in example 2.  
 
Table 2. Impact of different risk weights at 10% capital to RWA ratio 
 
 
In a real bank this difference would of course amount to many million SEK. 
Although this example only displays the difference in impact that loans with high 
risk-weight compared to loans with low risk-weight have on the capital buffer size, 
higher capital to RWA ratios means that the difference becomes higher, as can be 
seen in Table 3. In Table 3 the capital to RWA ratio is 15% instead of 10%, and the 
difference in required capital is instead 9 SEK.  
 
Example 1 - High risk Example 2 - Low risk
Capital to RWA ratio at 10% Capital to RWA ratio at 10%
Capital (SEK) Risk weight (%) RWA (SEK) Capital (SEK) Risk weight (%) RWA (SEK)
100 70,00% 70 100 70,00% 70
100 75,00% 75 100 75,00% 75
100 100,00% 100 100 100,00% 100
100 20,00% 20 100 20,00% 20
100 90,00% 90 100 30,00% 30
Total RWA 355 Total RWA 295
Total Reqired Capital: 35,5 Total Required Capital: 29,5




Table 3. Impact of different risk weights at 15% capital to RWA ratio 
 
 
With the increased capital requirements that has been implemented after the 
2008-crisis, it is reasonable to assume that the credit policy of a bank must change 
to accommodate the regulations. More caution and general avoidance of loans with 
high risk-weight means that the bank can issue more credits without it making a 
large impact on the required capital base. There are other reasons to avoid loans 
with a high risk-weight, as Handelsbanken first and foremost want their money 
back from an issued credit. The positive effect of focusing on low-risk loans as 
shown in Table 2 and Table 3 cannot be overlooked as a possible reason for this 
change in the guidelines for Handelsbanken’s employees.  
 
 
Example 1 - High risk Example 2 - Low risk
Capital to RWA ratio at 15% Capital to RWA ratio at 15%
Capital (SEK) Risk weight (%) RWA (SEK) Capital (SEK) Risk weight (%) RWA (SEK)
100 70,00% 70 100 70,00% 70
100 75,00% 75 100 75,00% 75
100 100,00% 100 100 100,00% 100
100 20,00% 20 100 20,00% 20
100 90,00% 90 100 30,00% 30
Total RWA 355 Total RWA 295
Total Reqired Capital: 53,25 Total Required Capital: 44,25




The final chapter of this thesis is where the research question is answered, and the 
findings of the study are concluded. This chapter also contain the opportunities for 
future research provided by this thesis. 
7.1 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this thesis was to study how the concept of resilience can explain why 
Handelsbanken remain strong during financial crises. Regulation frameworks play 
a big role in making banks resilient, as is their purpose (BCBS 2009). The large 
banks of Sweden are all subject to the same regulation framework issued by the 
Finansinspektionen. While the framework undoubtedly impacts the resilience of 
Handelsbanken, it would not be something that explains why Handelsbanken was 
more resilient in the crises than their competitors. Handelsbanken calculates their 
capital reserves differently than their competitors and while the details of this 
difference and the impact of this difference on resilience is unknown, perhaps it 
plays a crucial role in making Handelsbanken more resilient than the competitors. 
The extra, non-statutory, capital buffer Handelsbanken holds also contribute to the 
resilience. While this study has not confirmed whether any of the other large banks 
of Sweden also hold similar extra buffers, it is contributing to the resilience of 
Handelsbanken.  
The structure of Handelsbanken, revolving around a decentralisation, is perhaps 
the most important result of this study. The data shows that this is a unique factor 
for Handelsbanken. The policy of making local decisions has been in action during 
both crises covered in this thesis and all primary data points this out as what makes 
Handelsbanken stand out from the competition in terms of resilience. Because it is 
so deep-rooted in the organisation, it affects the way the employees make all their 
decisions and has become part of the organisational culture, not just a policy. 
Further, the organisational culture is focused around being risk averse. The impact 
this culture has on decision-making is an important cog in what makes 
Handelsbanken resilient. The caution and risk avoidance in decision-making is seen 
in how the processes has changed over the years. After the 2008-crisis, more 
precision and control are practiced when issuing credits. This is both to avoid the 
7. Conclusions 




risks of default loans, and possibly also to reduce the volume of the capital reserves 
as shown in Table 2 and Table 3. However, Handelsbanken has never liked risky 
credits, neither before nor after a crisis.  
Viewing the results from the concept of resilience as defined in this study, it is 
clear that Handelsbanken focuses primarily on anticipation. Regulations and a risk 
averse mentality serve to prevent the bank from being in a position where they need 
to take extraordinary measures to resist and recover. The reason for 
Handelsbanken’s lack of focus on measures to recover from a crisis is simply 
because they have never been in a position where such measures become necessary. 
This indicates that anticipatory resilience in banking can reduce the need for 
resilience connected to resistance and recovery. The focus on adaptation is also not 
very prevalent. Handelsbanken has adapted to the effects of the crisis, but not in 
any major way. The precision and control are increased post-crisis, but this is also 
the case in other banks. The adaptation was not necessary to survive, but rather to 
further increase the anticipatory resilience by further avoiding risk.  
7.2 Opportunities 
This thesis provides great opportunities for future research within the area. As 
this thesis focuses on the resilience of Handelsbanken, an interesting perspective 
would be the comparison between all the large banks of Sweden, for the purpose of 
identifying the factors of resilience that reside within the entire banking system of 
Sweden. To further broaden the perspective of the concept, interviews with 
employees from different parts of the organisations could highlight different aspects 
of resilience within the different banks. Similarly, a quantitative approach focusing 
on financial reports and the more mathematical aspects of the organisations could 
contribute to a new perspective, and perhaps a way to measure the effectiveness of 
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• (Om kontorschef) fråga hur väl enskilda kontor kan representera HB som 








• Stämma av hur det gick för handelsbanken i kriserna (om de vet) 
 
 
• ta reda på hur handelsbanken jobbar med resilience 
o Kolla utifrån “prevention” 
 Använder de något regleringsverk utöver EU/Sverige 
 Vad går det ut på? 
 Har de någon organisations-genomsyrade målsättning (Kultur) 
kring risktagande?  
 Vad går den ut på? (Siffror, tänk etc.) 
 Vid kreditgivning, hur ska en lånehandläggare tänka? Skiljer det 
sig från andra banker? 
o Kolla utifrån “resistance/recovery” 
 Kan de beskriva riskhantering HB arbetar efter vid en kris? Vid 
en lågkonjunktur? Finns det en krisplan? 
 Vad hände efter 2008/1993? Hur tog sig HB tillbaka så snabbt 
och effektivt som möjligt? 
o Kolla utifrån “adaptation 
 Förändrades något i tänket hos HB efter respektive kris? 
Förändrade HB på eget initiativ något i krishantering eller 
förebyggande åtgärder? 
Appendix  






• Är det något som bara HB gör som särskiljer dem från de andra stora svenska 
bankerna? (kan vara svårt att sätta fingret på, men viktigt att få fram, då jag måste 








Målet är att ta reda på hur handelsbanken jobbar med resilience. 
Handelsbanken klarade sig som bekant bättre under både 08/09-krisen och 
90-talskrisen än de andra storbankerna i Sverige. Förutsatt att alla 
storbanker i Sverige lyder under samma regelverk och regleringsverk 
gällande minimikrav på kapitalbas och dylikt, vad särskiljer HB?  
 
• Använder HB något regleringsverk utöver det som är lagstadgat inom 
EU/Sverige? 
 




• Vad går den ut på? (Siffror, tänk etc.) 
 
• Kan de beskriva riskhantering HB arbetar efter vid en kris? Vid en 
lågkonjunktur? Finns det en krisplan? 
 
 
• Vad hände efter 2008/1993? Hur tog sig HB tillbaka så snabbt och 
effektivt som möjligt? 
 
• Förändrades något i tänket hos HB efter respektive kris? Förändrade HB 
på eget initiativ något i krishantering eller förebyggande åtgärder? 
 
 
• Är det något som bara HB gör som särskiljer dem från de andra stora 
svenska bankerna?  
 
